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Ministerial Employees and Discrimination Without Remedy
CHARLOTTE GARDEN*
The Supreme Court first addressed the ministerial exemption in a 2012 case,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. The ministerial
exemption is a defense that religious employers can invoke in discrimination cases
brought by employees who qualify as “ministerial,” and it is rooted in the First
Amendment principle that government cannot interfere in a church’s choice of
minister. However, Hosanna-Tabor did not set out a test to determine which
employees are covered by this exemption, and the decision was susceptible to a
reading that the category was narrow. In 2020, the Court again took up the
ministerial exemption, this time staking out a broad test that will cover swaths of
teachers at religious schools, among others.
This Article explores the costs to employees of the ministerial exemption—
especially those who have no idea that they will not have legal recourse if their
employer discriminates against them based on a protected characteristic. It closes
by raising the possibility that state legislatures could adopt measures intended to
blunt these costs, either by helping to close the information gap, or by addressing
head-on the costs of discrimination without remedy.

* Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful for feedback on this article
received at the Indiana Law Journal symposium, Compelled Speech: The Cutting Edge of
First Amendment Jurisprudence, and to the editors of the Indiana Law Journal for their careful
editing.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC that the religion clauses of the First Amendment require what
is known as the “ministerial exemption” or “ministerial exception.”1 That exemption,
an affirmative defense that employers can raise when their “ministerial” 2 employees
attempt to enforce their rights under discrimination law, is grounded in the principle
that religious employers must be free to decide who will convey their religious
messages. The Hosanna-Tabor Court decided that the employee involved in the
case—a “called” teacher named Cheryl Perich—qualified as a ministerial employee;
the consequence of that determination was that Perich lost her disability
discrimination case without getting an opportunity to prove that discrimination
occurred.
Hosanna-Tabor did not direct lower courts to apply a particular test in
distinguishing ministerial from other employees, leaving that issue for another day.
Then, in 2020, the Court again took up the ministerial exemption. In two consolidated
cases, each involving a Catholic-school teacher, the Court announced a test focused
on whether an employee’s duties lay “at the very core of the mission of a private
religious school.”3 That test is relatively broad; it will mean that large numbers of
employees, including thousands of teachers at religious elementary and high schools,
will lack a legal remedy even if they are fired for a reason ordinarily covered by
antidiscrimination law.
This Article uses these three ministerial exemption cases as case studies to explore
some of the consequences of the ministerial exemption for the employees it affects.

1. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188
(2012).
2. Who is treated as a ministerial employee is discussed in detail in Part I of this Article.
In general, a ministerial employee is one whose job duties involve conveying the employer’s
religious message; exactly how to operationalize that definition in the context of an employee
whose duties are partly religious and partly secular is the subject of the cases discussed in this
Article.
3. Our Lady of Guad. Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020).
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It makes three main points. First, we should not assume that ministerial employees
understand that they are ministerial or why that status matters, and this lack of
knowledge can work to their detriment. Second, the ministerial exemption can shift
significant costs onto individual employees when they are fired without recourse,
and it can reduce religious employers’ incentives to comply with antidiscrimination
rules and norms, even if they have stated a commitment to those rules and norms.
And third, legislatures could consider policies designed to blunt the effects of the
ministerial exemption on employees.4 The Article closes with some preliminary
avenues for legislatures to consider, and proposes that legislatures can usefully look
to adapt solutions developed in a context with some parallels to the ministerial
exemption: the First Amendment right of union-represented public sector workers to
refuse to pay their share of the costs of union representation.
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION IN THE SUPREME COURT
This Section discusses three cases involving the ministerial exemption, each of
which eventually reached the Supreme Court. All three cases began with a religiously
affiliated school firing a teacher, allegedly in violation of federal antidiscrimination
law. In each case, there was at least a plausible allegation that discrimination had
occurred, yet no teacher was permitted to litigate the merits of their claim. Instead,
the Court concluded that each teacher was ministerial, and that the schools had a First
Amendment right to fire them without having to face legal consequences.
The purpose of this Section is to lay the groundwork for the argument that
employees’ incorrect beliefs that they have enforceable rights under discrimination

4. This Article is not intended to be a comprehensive examination or critique of the
ministerial exemption, but instead as an exploration of its consequences for employees,
including the large number of K-12 teachers at religious schools who will not be able to sue
their employers for many instances of discrimination because of the decisions in MorrisseyBerru and St. James School v. Biel, 140 S. Ct. 680 (2019), which is the case that was
consolidated with Morrissey-Berru in the Supreme Court. There is presently a circuit split
regarding whether the ministerial exemption applies in cases involving hostile work
environment claims. Compare Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that ministerial exemption did not categorically bar sexual harassment claims,
and concluding that the plaintiff could proceed on “narrower and thus viable sexual harassment
and retaliation claims that do not implicate protected employment decisions”) with Skrzypczak
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding plaintiff could
not proceed on harassment claim because “any Title VII action brought against a church by
one of its ministers will improperly interfere with the church’s right to select and direct its
ministers free from state interference”). For an analysis and discussion of these and other
cases, see Rachel Casper, When Harassment at Work is Harassment at Church: Hostile Work
Environments and the Ministerial Exception, 25 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 11 (2021). In
addition to claims brought under discrimination law, there is also potential for employers to
raise the ministerial exemption in other contexts. See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of
Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying statutory ministerial exemption in
wage-and-hour case, and stating that the FLSA ministerial exemption was coextensive with
the constitutional ministerial exemption); Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church of
Pittsburgh, 903 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying ministerial exemption to breach-of-contract
claim).
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law can influence their choices in ways that can ultimately—and perhaps
avoidably—harm them. Therefore, it provides relatively little discussion of the
Court’s reasoning regarding the ministerial exemption, nor does it critique these
decisions. Instead, it relies on court documents to describe the events that led to
litigation: the schools’ decisions and the teachers’ responses. To be clear, some of
these documents reflect allegations made by the teacher-plaintiffs that were never
evaluated by a factfinder; it is possible that they would have been contested in various
ways if these cases had gone to trial. For purposes of the discussion and analysis that
follows, I treat these statements as true.
A. Cheryl Perich
Cheryl Perich was hired by Hosanna-Tabor in 1999 as a contract teacher for a
one-year, renewable term. As a contract teacher, Perich was not required to be a
member of the Lutheran church. The following year, Perich completed the process
to become a “called” teacher, which involved completing a “colloquy” program at a
Lutheran college and then being selected by a congregation.5 This meant that she
became a “commissioned minister,” receiving job security, but continuing to perform
the same job duties.6
As both a lay teacher and a called teacher at Hosanna-Tabor, Perich taught secular
subjects as well as a religion class, attended chapel service with her class (and
occasionally led that service), and led her class in prayer each day.7 But this work
was interrupted when Perich became ill in 2004; she was eventually diagnosed with
narcolepsy.8 Because Perich’s illness interfered with her ability to do her job, she
began the 2004–05 school year on disability leave. However, Hosanna-Tabor’s
school principal, Stacy Hoeft, reportedly assured Perich she would still “have a job
with” the school when she was able to return to work.9
Hosanna-Tabor initially dealt with Perich’s medical leave by combining three
grade levels into one classroom. But when that arrangement proved unsatisfactory to
both parents and teachers, the school decided to hire a long-term substitute teacher.10
In mid-December, Perich told Hoeft she expected to be cleared to work within two
to three months, once her illness was controlled by medication.11 But on January 10,

5. A “colloquy” program is a program for Lutheran teachers that can be completed in
eight months and covers various topics related to religious doctrine and teaching in Lutheran
schools. The current curriculum for the program that Perich completed is available online. See
CONCORDIA UNIV. EDUC. NETWORK, cuenet.edu/colloquy/.
6. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2414707 at *4 (describing that lay
teachers are hired for one year at a time, whereas called teachers are hired for “open-ended
terms, and their call can be rescinded only for cause and only by a supermajority vote of the
congregation”).
7. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178.
8. Id.
9. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 773
(6th Cir. 2010).
10. Id. at 773 n.1.
11. Id. at 773.
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2005, Hoeft informed Perich that the school had a long-term substitute teacher in
place.12 Nine days later, Hoeft asked Perich “to begin considering and discussing
with her doctor what she might be able to do upon return,” and Perich replied that,
with medication, she would be able to perform all of her job duties.13
However, on January 21, “Hoeft informed Perich that the school board intended
to amend the employee handbook to request that employees on disability for more
than six months resign their calls to allow Hosanna-Tabor to responsibly fill their
positions.”14 By then, Perich had already been on medical leave for more than five
months, and so it would have been reasonable for her to have understood Hoeft’s
message to mean that her job was in jeopardy, or at least that the school board had
become unhappy about the length of Perich’s medical leave.
Perich responded less than a week later, on January 27, to indicate that she would
be able to return to work by late February.15 Hoeft expressed doubt that this was true,
and also indicated that the long-term substitute teacher hired to teach Perich’s class
was under contract through the end of the school year.16 Three days later, Hoeft
repeated these doubts during a congregational meeting, and school administrators
“opined that Perich would not be able to return to teaching that school year or the
next.”17 The congregation then “adopted the Board's proposal to request that Perich
accept a peaceful release agreement wherein Perich would resign her call in exchange
for the congregation paying for a portion of her health insurance premiums through
December 2005.”18 (A “peaceful release” is a resignation agreement that would have
left Perich eligible for employment at another Lutheran school.)
Around the same time, Perich received clearance from her doctor that she could
return to work on February 22.19 She met with the school board and presented her
doctor’s note, but the Board asked for her resignation anyway.20 Perich refused the
Board’s request on February 21 and reported to work the next day.21
When she arrived at Hosanna-Tabor, Perich was informed there was no job for
her. However, Perich refused to leave the school—the employee handbook indicated
that “failure to return to work on the first day following the expiration of an approved
medical leave is viewed as a voluntary termination,” and Perich’s medical leave was
over because her doctor had approved her to work.22 In other words, Perich could
reasonably have been afraid that if she went home, the school would later take the
position that she had resigned her job as of February 22. This situation was resolved
after Hoeft and the school board’s chairman gave Perich a letter asking that she

12. Id. at 773 n.1.
13. Id. at 773.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881,
884 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
18. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 885.
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continue her leave and asserting that she had given “improper notification of her
return to work.”23 Perich left the school.
Later that day, Perich and Hoeft spoke on the phone, and Perich “indicated that
she would assert her legal rights against discrimination.”24 Following this
conversation, the school board sent Perich a letter stating that she had to either accept
the previously offered “peaceful release,” or be fired for “insubordination and
disruptive behavior,” and for “threatening to take legal action.”25 Perich did not
accept the offer and retained counsel. When the school board went through with its
threat of termination, Perich filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).26
B. Kristen Biel
Kristen Biel began her teaching career by working at tutoring companies, and as
a “substitute teacher at several public and private schools,” before being hired first
as a long-term substitute, and then as a full-time teacher at St. James School.27 Biel
taught first grade as a long-term substitute beginning in March 2013, and then was
hired as a full-time fifth grade teacher for the 2013–14 school year; her title was
“teacher,” and the school directed her to consult the benefits guide for “lay
employees.”28 St. James was a Catholic school; Biel was Catholic, but she did not
have any formal training in religious pedagogy.29
Biel’s career at St. James was cut short after she was diagnosed with breast cancer
in April 2014, near the end of her first year of full-time teaching.30 After Biel
informed the school of the diagnosis, indicating that she would need to take time off
for treatment, the school principal told Biel that her contract would not be renewed
for the following year. While the school principal maintained that this decision was
due to problems with Biel’s classroom management, Biel alleged that the real reason
was her cancer diagnosis.31
C. Agnes Morrissey-Berru
Agnes Morrissey-Berru came to teaching as a second career; she was hired at Our
Lady of Guadalupe School in 1998, when she was forty-seven years old.32 Our Lady
of Guadalupe (OLG) was a Catholic school, but Morrissey-Berru did not consider
herself a practicing Catholic. Still, like Biel, Morrissey-Berru had some teaching
duties related to religious instruction, and she was considered a “catechist”—a

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 885–86.
27. Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018).
28. Id.; Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Biel, 911 F.3d at 103a (No. 17-55180).
29. Biel, 911 F.3d at 605.
30. Id. at 606.
31. Id.
32. Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guad. Sch., No. 2:16-cv-09353-SVW-AFM, 2017
WL 6527336, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017).
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designation that signals that she was a “lay member[] of the Christian faithful” whose
work included “setting forth the teaching of the gospel.”33 However, MorrisseyBerru’s main duties involved teaching secular subjects, and she had not received
formal religious training. Morrissey-Berru spent ten years as a full-time sixth-grade
teacher, and then switched to fifth grade, where she remained a full-time teacher from
the 1999–2000 school year through the 2013–14 school year.34 In 2014, MorrisseyBerru learned that her school principal, April Beuder, was dissatisfied with
Morrissey-Berru’s performance, and at the end of that year, Beuder offered
Morrissey-Berru only a part-time position for the following year. Morrissey-Berru
testified in a deposition that Beuder asked her if she “wanted to retire,” and criticized
her “reading and writing instruction.”35 Morrissey-Berru unhappily accepted the
part-time job.36
In a letter to the EEOC, Morrissey-Berru recounted that after she learned from
Beuder that she would not be renewed in a full-time position, she began seeking a
new full-time position at another school.37 She then applied for a position teaching
fifth grade at St. James school38—in a remarkable coincidence, this was presumably
the position that had opened when Kristen Biel lost her job. However, MorrisseyBerru did not get the job; she stated that she had learned that Beuder said “good
things about [Morrissey-Berru]” during a reference check, but also said that she was
“retiring.”39 Morrissey-Berru further stated that Beuder was later “furious” that
Morrissey-Berru was trying to get a new full-time position so close to the beginning
of the school year, after she had accepted a part-time post at OLG.40
The 2014–15 school year was Morrissey-Berru’s last at OLG. In her letter to the
EEOC, Morrissey-Berru explained that she had asked to stay on even if she could
not work full time, but the school decided not to renew her contract in any capacity.41
Morrissey-Berru reported the situation to the “downtown Catholic archdiocese
personnel representative,”42 and ultimately filed a charge with the EEOC.43
* * *

33. Code of Canon Law, available at https://www.vatican.va/archive/cod-iuriscanonici/eng/documents/cic_lib3-cann781-792_en.html [https://perma.cc/AGC5-EZFK].
34. Id.
35. Joint Appendix on Writs of Certiorari at 85, Our Lady of Guad. Sch. v. MorrisseyBerru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (Nos. 19-267 & 19-348).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 104. This letter reflects only Morrissey-Berru’s own account of what happened.
38. Id. In her letter to the EEOC, Morrissey-Berru explained that she applied “for a 5th
grade teaching position at St. James Catholic school two miles down the street.”
39. Id. (recounting Morrissey-Berru’s conversation with Principal Sister Margaret of St.
James school).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 105.
42. Id.
43. Joint Appendix, supra note 35, at 169.
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The Hosanna-Tabor Court decided that Perich was covered by the ministerial
exemption for several reasons: the school held Perich out as a minister;44 she had “a
significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of
commissioning”;45 Perich held herself out as a minister, including by claiming a tax
exemption for ministers;46 and her duties “reflected a role in conveying the Church’s
message and carrying out its mission.”47 However, the Court did not announce a test
or threshold to apply to future cases, and some later courts—including the Ninth
Circuit in the Morrissey-Berru and Biel cases48—read the scope of the exemption
relatively narrowly.
The Supreme Court rejected the narrow approach in Morrissey-Berru, writing that
“[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an employee does,” in that “educating young
people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are
responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious school.”49
Under that standard, the Court added, teachers at religious schools who lack formal
training in religious doctrine or pedagogy, and who do not hold religious titles such
as “minister,” may nonetheless be ministerial employees;50 moreover, it is not a
requirement that the employee be a practicing member of the faith, or even belong to
the same faith as the employing institution.51 Conversely, the Court continued,
religious institutions’ own “definition and explanation” of their employees’ roles “in
the life of the religion in question [are] important.”52
Dissenting, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the
ministerial exemption should be limited to positions involving religious leadership.53
Beyond that, they also criticized the majority’s analysis for “priz[ing] a functional
importance that it appears to deem churches in the best position to explain,” an

44. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190–
91 (2012).
45. Id. at 191.
46. Id. at 191–92.
47. Id. at 192.
48. In Morrissey-Berru, the Court considered (1) whether the employer held the employee
out as a minister by bestowing a formal religious title; (2) whether the employee’s title
reflected ministerial substance and training; (3) whether the employee held herself out as a
minister; and (4) whether the employee’s job duties included “important religious functions,”
and concluded that—although she “did have significant religious responsibilities”—
Morrissey-Berru was not a ministerial employee because she held a secular job title
(“teacher”), had little religious training, and did not hold herself out as a minister. Our Lady
of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2058, 2074. Similarly, in Biel, the Court considered the same
four factors, and concluded Biel was not a ministerial employee because she had little religious
training, no religious title, and did not hold herself out as a minister. Biel, 911 F.3d at 608–09.
Further, the Court noted that Biel’s duties included relatively little religious instruction or
leadership, as compared to Perich’s duties. Id. at 609.
49. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2064.
50. Id. at 2066.
51. Id. at 2068–69.
52. Id. at 2066.
53. Id. at 2071–73.
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approach that they wrote “traded legal analysis for a rubber stamp.”54 The crux of the
dissenters’ argument was that the Court’s approach would deprive many employees
working at religious institutions of the protections of employment-discrimination
law,55 and that the Court’s deference to religious entities’ own assessments of their
employees’ duties was flawed because those assessments could be self-serving.56
II. THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF EMPLOYEE IGNORANCE
Among the reasons Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissented was their fear that
religious employers would strategically cast plaintiff-employees’ jobs as having a
substantial religious component in order to avoid discrimination law:
So long as the employer determines that an employee’s ‘duties’ are
‘vital’ to ‘carrying out the mission of the church,’ then today’s laissezfaire analysis appears to allow that employer to make employment
decisions because of a person’s skin color, age, disability, sex, or any
other protected trait for reasons having nothing to do with religion.57
They might have put an even finer point on their critique: the ministerial exemption
allows employers to mislead their employees about their rights at the recruitment and
hiring stages, and then to invoke the ministerial exemption if the employee sues.
Consider the school in Hosanna-Tabor. Hosanna-Tabor was a “member
congregation” of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod,58 and the Synod publishes
an Employment Resource Manual for Congregations and Districts. That manual (at
least in its 2016 iteration) implies that Synod policy was to follow the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) with respect to employment. Specifically, the manual
contains a chapter entitled “Federal Employment Law” that discusses the ADA; that
chapter describes both the employment and the public accommodations provisions
of the ADA, adding that “[c]hurch and school employers should be aware of all
applicable rules and regulations” set forth in the ADA, and then that “[e]mployers
need to understand the legal restrictions about discriminating against disabled
individuals.” The manual then states that
[w]hen the rules and regulations are not applicable to a church and/or
school, christian care and concern should be exercised by the
organization by not discriminating against persons with disabilities and

54. Id. at 2076. In a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas wrote that
“judges do not shirk their judicial duty or provide a mere ‘rubber stamp’ when they defer to a
religious organization’s sincere beliefs.” Id. at 2069–70 (citation omitted). This observation
seems like less a refutation of the “rubber stamp” charge than an assertion that a rubber stamp
is constitutionally required.
55. Id. at 2082 (citing amicus brief estimating that “over a hundred thousand secular
teachers” could be affected by a broad ministerial exemption).
56. Id. (writing that the Court’s rule permits “religious entities to discriminate widely and
with impunity for reasons wholly divorced from religious beliefs”).
57. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
58. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 177
(2012).
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should, where reasonably possible without undue hardship, take the lead
in making reasonable accommodations for disabled workers as set forth
in the ADA.59
That last statement immediately follows the manual’s discussion of the ADA’s
public accommodations provision, which, the manual states, “specifically
exempt[s]” churches.60 Therefore, a reader might assume that the language about the
ADA’s non-application was intended to refer to public accommodations, and not
employment. A close reader of the manual might also notice that a later discussion
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that “the law provides a ministerial
exception” that covers “ordained and commissioned ministers.”61 The absence of a
similar caveat in the discussion of the ADA might lead that reader to assume that the
ministerial exemption was not available under that statute.
The employment contracts that Biel and Morrissey-Berru signed at the beginning
of each school year were similarly unclear about the ministerial exemption. Biel’s
employment contract for the 2013–14 school year stated that St. James “may
terminate your employment if you are unable to perform the essential functions of
your position and reasonable accommodation is not available or required under
applicable laws.”62 It also stated that St. James teachers lacked tenure rights,63 though
it did not say anything about teachers’ inability to invoke statutory employment
protections. Morrissey-Berru’s contract was substantially the same as Biel’s; in
addition, Our Lady of Guadalupe’s faculty handbook “promised not to discriminate
on the basis of any protected characteristic, including ‘race,’ ‘sex,’ ‘disability,’ or
‘age.’”64
Of course, this ambiguity will not matter if employees know about the ministerial
exemption (and the likelihood that they will fall under it) for another reason. But this
seems unlikely. Research suggests that, even outside of the ministerial exemption
context, employees generally have an inflated sense of the extent to which they are
protected from being arbitrarily or discriminatorily fired. Professor Pauline Kim
concluded based on survey evidence that employees “consistently overestimate the
degree of job protection afforded by law,”65 and there is no readily apparent reason

59. A version of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod Employment Resource Manual for
Congregations and Districts dated June 2016 is currently available online at
https://files.lcms.org/wl/?id=gK1GGEUoouogF4QRDoxX3UDhsir8SNJf [https://perma.cc/
49WN-WN7G]. The above quote is found on page four of the 2016 manual. Perich’s brief in
the Supreme Court quotes some of this language from a 2003 version of the same manual.
Brief for Petitioner at 6, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10–553).
60. Employment Resource Manual, supra note 59, at 3.
61. Id. at 12.
62. Joint Appendix at 95, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct.
2049 (No. 19-267) (2020); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at 100a, St. James Sch. v.
Biel, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (19-267) (2020).
63. Joint Appendix at 96, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (No. 19-267).
64. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2078 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
record excerpts).
65. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997);
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to believe that employees would have greater knowledge of the ministerial
exemption—to the contrary, it is routinely reflected in popular media and news
reporting that employment discrimination based on protected characteristics is
illegal; the same cannot be said of the ministerial exception.
This matters in part because employees who believe they can resort to legal
protections against employment discrimination might behave in ways that—in the
absence of those protections—might ultimately hurt them. Perich’s case offers a
case-in-point. Assuming the facts were as Perich alleged, she likely realized that her
job was in danger in January 2005. By then, Perich had told Hoeft that she expected
to be able to return to work sometime between mid-February and mid-April. But on
January 10, Perich learned that the school had hired a long-term substitute teacher—
with the implication that, once Perich returned, the school would have to pay an extra
salary, for which it had presumably not budgeted. Then, Hoeft asked Perich what she
“might be able to do upon return,”66 implying that Hoeft did not believe that Perich’s
narcolepsy was controlled. Finally, Hoeft told Perich that the school board was
planning to “amend the employee handbook”67 to make clear that employees on
disability leave for more than six months should resign. Whether Perich thought that
amendment would apply to her, or instead would be applied only to future situations,
the amendment at least underscored that the school hoped for Perich’s resignation.
Those and other events, discussed in Section I.A, could be interpreted to suggest
that the school had two concerns: first, the financial burden of paying for Perich’s
salary and the substitute teacher’s; and second, that Perich had not controlled her
narcolepsy, and therefore would not be a safe classroom teacher.68 Perich’s behavior
suggests that she was understandably frustrated by this response—after all, Hoeft
had promised her job would be safe, and the school’s concerns about her condition
appeared to be speculative and not based in any specific knowledge about Perich’s
prognosis.69
Perich’s next steps made sense if one starts from the premise that she was
protected by anti-discrimination laws, including the ADA. Essentially, Perich stood
on her rights as she understood them, rejecting the school’s demand that she resign
in exchange for a one-year health-insurance subsidy and eligibility to be hired at
another Lutheran school, instead insisting on returning to work. Of course, it turned
out that Perich’s premise was incorrect.
It is worth briefly considering how Perich’s situation might have played out if she
had known that she was a ministerial employee. To begin, Perich might have decided
that her best path forward would be to address the school’s concerns. Perhaps she

see also Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-atWill in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 330 (2002) (concluding, based on a survey of employees in
two states, that “[n]ot only do they not know about or misapply the at-will doctrine, they hold
beliefs about their current level of legal job security that are simply wrong. Employees
erroneously believe that the law prevents employers from discharging them in a wide variety
of situations where the law does not protect them”).
66. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Church and Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2010).
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 9, 16–17 and accompanying text.
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might have tried to do that by offering to take a period of unpaid leave that would
end once the long-term substitute was off the books—a strategy that would also allow
more time to demonstrate to the school’s satisfaction that her condition was under
control. Alternatively, Perich might have concluded that there was no hope for a good
outcome, and that her best course was to take the offered settlement and seek a
position with another school. Other paths might occur to readers—the goal here is
not to enumerate all possible options, but simply to illustrate that Perich had
alternatives, and that she might have taken one of them if she had known that her
preferred strategy—a disability discrimination lawsuit—would be a non-starter.
Ignorance of the ministerial exemption might also affect employees’ and job
applicants’ choices before anything goes wrong. For example, employees who know
that they are likely to be considered ministerial employees might decide they are not
willing to effectively forego the ability to bring a successful civil-rights claim, and
decide to seek another job rather than to accept work with a religious employer.
Kristin Biel, for example, might have made that decision—particularly because the
facts do not show that she was drawn to St. James because of its religious character.70
As the Ninth Circuit put it, “Biel appears to have taken on teaching work wherever
she could find it: tutoring companies, multiple public schools, another Catholic
school, and even a Lutheran school.”71 Employees who believe themselves to be at
particular risk of discrimination might be especially likely to go this route.
Alternatively, these applicants might seek other assurances from the employer, for
example, by negotiating for the employer to make available a specific benefit, such
as paid or unpaid disability or parental leave.72
III. THE PROSPECT OF LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR MINISTERIAL EMPLOYEES
WHO LOSE THEIR JOBS
It is worth briefly discussing the consequences of remedy-less discrimination that
results in job loss.73 Some of these consequences are obvious, severe, and
immediate—loss of financial security and psychological harm, for example.74 In
addition, if the employee plans to work again, they will have to seek another job. But

70. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The facts surrounding Biel’s employment
history are at least consistent with a story in which Biel was applying broadly for teaching jobs
and happened to land at a Catholic school.
71. Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018).
72. Some courts have held that religious employers can invoke the ministerial exemption
defense in breach of contract cases. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 4. If that is right, then the value
of a negotiated agreement with a religious employer will be limited. Professor Charlie Sullivan
has pointed out that this result puts religious employers at a disadvantage, leaving them
essentially unable to negotiate an enforceable employment contract. Accordingly, he has
convincingly argued that many “clergy contracts” should be enforceable, even if courts
ultimately refuse to enforce contracts in certain cases that raise “religious questions in
violation of ecclesiastical abstention.” Charles A. Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, 22 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 371, 407 (2018).
73. A similar set of harms can apply to workers who are discriminated against in other
ways, such as being passed over for promotion.
74. See Stephanie Pappas, The Toll of Job Loss, 51 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 54 (2020)
(summarizing psychological research on the effects of job loss).
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job searching while unemployed means contending with difficult questions about
what happened at the previous job. It also means contending with potential employer
bias: research shows that employers often harbor bias against unemployed job
applicants,75 and there is also the possibility that prospective employers will
discriminate based on the same characteristic as did the previous employer. Of
course, non-ministerial employees also face these harms, but employment
discrimination remedies like back pay, front-pay, and reinstatement are intended to
deter discrimination and blunt its costs when it does occur.76
Morrissey-Berru’s situation illustrates how the consequences of unremedied
discrimination can reverberate. Compared to Biel and Perich, Morrissey-Berru had a
fairly long tenure at Our Lady of Guadalupe. The district court implicitly referenced
that fact in the following passage:
In 1998, Morrissey-Berru began working at Our Lady of Guadalupe as a
substitute teacher. When she began working for the school, MorrisseyBerru was forty-seven years old. She began as a full-time 6th grade
teacher in the fall of 1999. She taught 6th grade for 10 years, after which
she switched to teaching 5th grade. The intervening period is
unimportant for the purposes of the instant motion. The next significant
event occurred in 2014.77
When the court wrote that Morrissey-Berru’s fifteen-year tenure was
“unimportant for the purposes of the instant motion,” it was correct in one sense: the
ministerial exemption inquiry focuses on job duties, not length of tenure. But for
Morrissey-Berru herself, the fifteen years between when she was hired and when she
was fired would have mattered for multiple reasons: her sense of professional identity
and belonging; the seniority and school-specific expertise she had acquired; and—
critically for purposes of this Article—the difficulty or ease with which she would
be able to find a new job.
Morrissey-Berru was forty-seven when she began working for Our Lady of
Guadalupe, and she was in her early sixties when she was fired.78 These facts alone
make it likely that she would have had a hard time finding a new job after she was
fired—research shows that older employees who lose their jobs often have a very
difficult time finding new jobs. One pair of researchers characterized age

75. Geoffrey C. Ho, Margaret Shih, Daniel J. Walters & Todd L. Pittinsky, The Stigma of
Unemployment: When Joblessness Leads to Being Jobless, INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. & EMP.
(2011), available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7nh039h1 [https://perma.cc/ULU3CLQN];
Rand
Ghayad,
The
Jobless
Trap
(2013),
available
at
http://media.wix.com/ugd/576e9a_f6cf3b6661e44621ad26547112f66691.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XZ2X-XL65] (finding employer bias against the long-term unemployed).
76. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing purpose of Title
VII’s remedial scheme to “make possible the ‘fashion[ing of] the most complete relief
possible’”) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972)).
77. Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., No. 2:16-cv-o9353, 2017 WL
65227336, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017) (internal record citations omitted).
78. Id.
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discrimination in hiring as “pervasive”;79 another study found that, compared to their
younger counterparts, older workers tend to be unemployed longer, to have a harder
time getting rehired, and to be less likely to find a new job that pays as well as the
old job.80 Finally, women are more likely than men to be discriminated against based
on their age.81
In other words, Morrissey-Berru’s many years of service at Our Lady of
Guadalupe left her at greater risk of age discrimination at other schools to which she
might apply.82 To be clear, any worker whose identity places them at risk of
discrimination in hiring may face a lengthy and painful job search, compounding the
harm that occurs when a worker loses a job because of discrimination. But age
discrimination becomes more likely as workers get older,83 meaning that the more
time Morrissey-Berru spent at Our Lady of Guadalupe, the more she could expect to
face discrimination-related obstacles to finding a new job. And Perich’s and Biel’s
situations show how a similar dynamic can affect workers who come to need
disability accommodations or time off to deal with illness while working as
ministerial employees. If these employees are fired because their employer does not

79. David Neumark & Joanne Song, Do Stronger Age Discrimination Laws Make Social
Security Reforms More Effective?, 108 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1–2 (2013) (citing studies); see also
Scott J. Adams & David Neumark, HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 203
(William M. Rogers III, ed., 2006); David Neumark, Experimental Research on Labor Market
Discrimination, 56 J. ECON. LIT. 799, 802 (2018) (“During and after the Great Recession
unemployment durations rose particularly sharply for older workers, as did ADEA claims filed
with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.”).
80. Scott J. Adams & David Neumark, Age Discrimination in US Labor Markets: A
Review of the Evidence, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 203 (William
M. Rogers III, ed., 2006); see also David Neumark, Ian Burn & Patrick Button, Is it Harder
for Older Workers to Find Jobs? New and Improved Evidence from a Field Experiment, 127
J. POL. ECON. 922 (2019).
81. David Neumark, Age Discrimination in the U.S. Labor Market, 43 GENERATIONS: J.
OF THE AM. SOC’Y ON AGING 51, 56 (2019) (noting that “women experience more age
discrimination than do men”); Joanna N. Lahey, Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experimental
Study, 43 J. HUM. RES. 30, 46 (2008).
82. Of course, while an employee who suspects discrimination in hiring by a secular
employer can usually sue, it is often still extremely difficult for a job applicant to prove
discrimination. Among other reasons, applicants may lack the information necessary to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination. To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, a
plaintiff must show they are a member of a protected class; they were qualified for the position;
they applied for the position and were not hired; and the position was filled by someone with
similar or inferior qualifications. See, e.g., Taite v. Bridgewater State Univ., 999 F.3d 86, 93
(1st Cir. 2021). One reason it can be difficult to establish a prima facie case is that it is often
difficult for a plaintiff to learn which candidate was ultimately hired, and what their
qualifications were. Discrimination cases are never easy to win. See generally Sandra F.
Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011); Michael Selmi, Why
are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001). But
employees can have an easier time proving discrimination by their current employers as
compared to applicants considering a lawsuit against an employer to whom they have only
applied.
83. Neumark, supra note 81, at 56 (“[O]lder applicants near the age of retirement
experience more age discrimination.”).
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want to provide these measures, then they will then have to deal with all the
disruption and distress of losing a job, plus the greater risk of (hard-to-prove)
discrimination by prospective future employers.
So far, this Article has explored some of the consequences of the ministerial
exemption for employees. The next Section explores whether legislatures might be
able to blunt these consequences.
IV. RESPONDING TO THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION
In brainstorming strategies to minimize the effects of the ministerial exemption
on employees while also not impinging on employers’ rights, legislatures might look
to an unlikely source: laws and policies governing the relationship between unions
and represented workers. In 2014, the Supreme Court held that certain unionized
home healthcare workers who were paid by state governments had a First
Amendment right to refuse to pay anything to the union that represented them.84
Then, in 2018, the Court extended that rule to all public employees.85 These cases,
like the ministerial exemption cases, involved highly contested First Amendment
questions that were also culturally and politically salient. But there are also some
more specific parallels between the two lines of cases. For one, both employers who
can invoke the ministerial exemption and public employees who have a right to
refrain from paying union dues or fees each have a financial incentive to invoke their
rights that is separate from the religious or ideological reasons that gave rise to the
right. Put more concretely, union-represented workers have a financial incentive to
free ride on dues paid by others, especially because they are entitled to fair
representation by the union even if they do not pay.86 Similarly, religious employers
have a financial incentive to dodge legal liability even if their reason for firing a
ministerial employee had nothing to do with religion and was instead, say, a bare
desire not to incur the costs associated with accommodating the employee’s
disability. Moreover, in both situations, the costs of exercising the First Amendment
right are ultimately borne by identifiable others: ministerial employees who lose
otherwise-viable discrimination claims, or union-represented workers who pick up
the slack so that the union has the funds it needs to function as bargaining
representative for a group of employees.
In the union context, states and unions have adopted a number of strategies to
blunt the effects of Harris and Janus, and some of those strategies might be usefully
adapted into the ministerial exemption context. In their article, After Janus,
Professors Catherine Fisk and Marty Malin catalog and evaluate these strategies,
which include shifting some of the union’s costs to the government, creating a
mechanism to educate employees about the union’s role, and building solidarity that
counters the desire to free ride on one’s co-workers. The remainder of this section

84. Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 656 (2014).
85. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2459–60 (2018).
86. See Catherine L. Fisk & Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1826–
33 (2020) (discussing in detail the collective action problem that results from the combination
of a right not to pay union dues and the union obligation to provide fair representation even to
nonpaying workers).
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briefly discusses how two of these strategies—disclosure and shifting costs to the
government—might be adapted to the ministerial exemption context.
A. Disclosure and Education
Section III of this Article suggests that employees who know they are likely to be
considered ministerial will be better positioned to protect their own interests than
employees who assume they will be able to rely on discrimination law. A knowledge
problem suggests a disclosure solution—for example, that religious employers be
required to inform employees and applicants in advance that the employer considers
their duties to “lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious school.”87
After all, the Morrissey-Berru Court emphasized that the religious employer is the
entity most likely to possess this information; it seems only fair that the employer
share that information with the employee or applicant. The information could be
accompanied by state-drafted plain-language information about what the ministerial
exemption is, and how it works.
There are at least three ways in which an advance disclosure could be valuable to
an applicant or employee. First, they may decide to seek a job with a different
employer, prioritizing meaningful employment law protections over working for the
religious employer. Second, they might ask their employer questions about its
policies regarding disability accommodation, or pregnancy leave, or attempt to
negotiate contractual protections, subject to the caveat that the employer may also be
able to invoke the ministerial exemption in a breach-of-contract claim.88 Third, once
in the job, the employee might approach the employer differently (or not at all) about
certain topics. For example, a pregnant employee might keep their status under wraps
for longer than they would if they had effective protection under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act—a fraught choice to be sure, but nonetheless one that employees
should be able to make for themselves with complete information.
Still, there are legal and practical drawbacks to this solution. One legal barrier
concerns the development of an enforcement mechanism to ensure that employers
actually give the required notice. Legislatures might try conditioning employers’
abilities to raise the ministerial exemption on the provision of the notice at the time
the employee accepts a job that involves ministerial duties—but it is not clear that
this solution would work, because courts may hold that employers cannot waive the
ministerial exemption, including by failing to make a required disclosure.
Some circuit courts have already held in other contexts that employers cannot
waive the ministerial exemption through their conduct. The Sixth Circuit concluded
that an employer did not waive the ministerial exception by writing on its website
that it would not discriminate based on protected characteristics;89 the court wrote
that the exemption could not be waived because it was a “structural” protection that
“categorically prohibits federal and state governments from becoming involved in
religious leadership disputes.”90 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a

87. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064 (2020).
88. See supra note 72.
89. Appellant’s Brief on Appeal at 4, Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777
F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1549).
90. Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 2015).
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church had not waived the ministerial exemption by describing itself as an “equal
opportunity” employer, writing that “the ministerial exception, like the rest of the
internal-affairs doctrine, is not subject to waiver or estoppel.”91 Scholars Peter Smith
and Robert Tuttle have made a similar argument, writing that the ministerial
exemption cannot be waived because it “applies not just to protect the liberty of
religious organizations but also because civil government lacks competence to
resolve religious questions”; they reason that treating the ministerial exemption as
waived could leave courts in the untenable position of having to resolve ecclesiastical
questions.92
On the other hand, the Hosanna-Tabor Court described the ministerial exception
as “an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional
bar.”93 Here, the Hosanna-Tabor Court seemed to be saying that courts need not
independently assure themselves that the ministerial exemption did not apply before
proceeding to hear a case. But affirmative defenses can typically be waived if they
are not pleaded, which suggests that procedural hurdles like a notice requirement
could also be enforced. Adopting that view, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a
religious school waived the argument that the ministerial exemption applied when it
failed to argue on appeal that the district court had erred in rejecting the defense.94
Providing a theoretical justification for that view, Professor Michael Helfand
writes that the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s statement that the ministerial exemption is an
affirmative defense “reorient[s] our religion clause jurisprudence away from the
structural and jurisdictional limitations we place on courts and towards the autonomy
and authority we grant religious institutions.”95 Helfand contextualizes HosannaTabor and earlier church autonomy cases as reflecting a principle that “religious
institutions retain authority over cases where the institution’s jurisdiction can both
be justified on the front end via implied consent.”96 In other words, Helfand
analogizes the ministerial exemption to arbitration in which parties actually or
impliedly consent to resolve their disputes in a non-judicial forum. A disclosure
requirement would be consistent with this understanding of the ministerial exemption
in that it would make the idea of implied consent more meaningful, by improving
employees’ understanding of what they are consenting to.
Assuming legal barriers could be overcome, there are also practical barriers to a
disclosure rule. Employees may have a difficult time grasping the meaning or
importance of the disclosure, or the disclosure may get lost in a sea of “onboarding”
paperwork and never be read closely—a critique that is commonly (and justifiably)

91. Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006).
92. Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1847, 1884–85 (2018).
93. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 n.4
(2012) (collecting cases and writing that “the issue presented by the exception is ‘whether the
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,’ not whether the court has ‘power to hear
the case’”).
94. Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012).
95. Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1891, 1901 (2013).
96. Id. at 1903.
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leveled at disclosure rules.97 Conversely, if employees do understand the warning,
then there is a risk that over-designation will deter employees who would not be
covered by the ministerial exemption from pursuing a claim.98 In short, states
considering this type of requirement should not actually implement a notice
requirement without studying whether and how job applicants are likely to
understand and act on the notice.
B. The Government Pays
In the union context, this solution refers to shifting some of the costs of union
representation to the public employer. In the ministerial exemption context, it would
involve shifting costs of employer discrimination from the employee to the state.
This might look like providing extended unemployment benefits or other support to
employees who can make an abbreviated showing that they lost their job for a reason
that would violate discrimination law, even though they are likely ministerial
employees. Alternatively, the government could prioritize workers who can make
such a showing for near-equivalent public-sector jobs. For example, many (though
not all) employees likely to be affected by the ministerial exemption will be K–12
teachers, and these employees could be prioritized for open positions in public
schools—a strategy that would help blunt the set of difficulties likely to be associated
with finding new work that were discussed in Part IV. A government adopting this
strategy should also consider waiving requirements that normally apply before an
employee can access benefits like pregnancy or medical leave, so that an employee
who is fired because they sought or took a leave can transition relatively seamlessly.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s focus is the consequences of the ministerial exemption for
individual workers who effectively lose the ability to seek enforcement of
discrimination law in court. These costs are compounded when workers’
unfamiliarity with the exemption leads them to choose a course of action that
assumes effective recourse to discrimination law. Employment policy cannot
eliminate the ministerial exemption—but it may be able to lower the costs to
individual employees. There are strong fairness and equity arguments for states to
consider these policies—though there are also tricky design problems that should be
the subject of future research.

97. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE (2012).
98. If providing notice is a condition of raising the ministerial exemption defense, then
religious employers will have an incentive to provide a notice to everyone on the payroll. One
countervailing consideration is that the notice might make it harder to hire—though, as
discussed above, that will not be the case if the notice is not often read and understood.
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